Commit e8f9d3ef authored by ROOL's avatar ROOL 🤖
Browse files

Library update

Detail:
  This is release 2.16.7 direct from ARM, with customisations to ro_config.h/timing.c/entropy_poll.c/net_sockets.[c|h] to port to RISC OS.

Version 2.19. Tagged as 'mbedTLS-2_19'
parent d774b73b
/* (2.18)
/* (2.19)
*
* This file is automatically maintained by srccommit, do not edit manually.
*
*/
#define Module_MajorVersion_CMHG 2.18
#define Module_MajorVersion_CMHG 2.19
#define Module_MinorVersion_CMHG
#define Module_Date_CMHG 22 Apr 2020
#define Module_Date_CMHG 08 Jul 2020
#define Module_MajorVersion "2.18"
#define Module_Version 218
#define Module_MajorVersion "2.19"
#define Module_Version 219
#define Module_MinorVersion ""
#define Module_Date "22 Apr 2020"
#define Module_Date "08 Jul 2020"
#define Module_ApplicationDate "22-Apr-20"
#define Module_ApplicationDate "08-Jul-20"
#define Module_ComponentName "mbedTLS"
#define Module_FullVersion "2.18"
#define Module_HelpVersion "2.18 (22 Apr 2020)"
#define Module_LibraryVersionInfo "2:18"
#define Module_FullVersion "2.19"
#define Module_HelpVersion "2.19 (08 Jul 2020)"
#define Module_LibraryVersionInfo "2:19"
......@@ -269,6 +269,22 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y )
memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) );
}
/*
* Conditionally assign dest = src, without leaking information
* about whether the assignment was made or not.
* dest and src must be arrays of limbs of size n.
* assign must be 0 or 1.
*/
static void mpi_safe_cond_assign( size_t n,
mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
unsigned char assign )
{
size_t i;
for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
dest[i] = dest[i] * ( 1 - assign ) + src[i] * assign;
}
/*
* Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information
* about whether the assignment was made or not.
......@@ -288,10 +304,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned
X->s = X->s * ( 1 - assign ) + Y->s * assign;
for( i = 0; i < Y->n; i++ )
X->p[i] = X->p[i] * ( 1 - assign ) + Y->p[i] * assign;
mpi_safe_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign );
for( ; i < X->n; i++ )
for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ )
X->p[i] *= ( 1 - assign );
cleanup:
......@@ -1276,10 +1291,24 @@ cleanup:
return( ret );
}
/*
* Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction
/**
* Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction.
*
* Calculate d - s where d and s have the same size.
* This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry
* (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `d < s`, and 0 otherwise).
*
* \param n Number of limbs of \p d and \p s.
* \param[in,out] d On input, the left operand.
* On output, the result of the subtraction:
* \param[in] s The right operand.
*
* \return 1 if `d < s`.
* 0 if `d >= s`.
*/
static void mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d )
static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n,
mbedtls_mpi_uint *d,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s )
{
size_t i;
mbedtls_mpi_uint c, z;
......@@ -1290,28 +1319,22 @@ static void mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d )
c = ( *d < *s ) + z; *d -= *s;
}
while( c != 0 )
{
z = ( *d < c ); *d -= c;
c = z; d++;
}
return( c );
}
/*
* Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9)
* Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10)
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B )
{
mbedtls_mpi TB;
int ret;
size_t n;
mbedtls_mpi_uint carry;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL );
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB );
if( X == B )
......@@ -1334,7 +1357,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
if( B->p[n - 1] != 0 )
break;
mpi_sub_hlp( n, B->p, X->p );
carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, B->p );
if( carry != 0 )
{
/* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */
for( ; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++ )
--X->p[n];
/* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result
* is negative. */
if( n == X->n )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE );
--X->p[n];
}
cleanup:
......@@ -1914,18 +1948,34 @@ static void mpi_montg_init( mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N )
*mm = ~x + 1;
}
/*
* Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36)
/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36)
*
* \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply.
* It must have at least as many limbs as N
* (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored.
* On successful completion, A contains the result of
* the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where
* R = (2^ciL)^n.
* \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply.
* It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N
* (B->n <= N->n).
* \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd.
* \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`.
* This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL.
* \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage.
* It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2
* (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)).
* Its initial content is unused and
* its final content is indeterminate.
* Note that unlike the usual convention in the library
* for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change.
*/
static int mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
static void mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
const mbedtls_mpi *T )
{
size_t i, n, m;
mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d;
if( T->n < N->n + 1 || T->p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
memset( T->p, 0, T->n * ciL );
d = T->p;
......@@ -1946,22 +1996,34 @@ static int mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi
*d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0;
}
memcpy( A->p, d, ( n + 1 ) * ciL );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, N ) >= 0 )
mpi_sub_hlp( n, N->p, A->p );
else
/* prevent timing attacks */
mpi_sub_hlp( n, A->p, T->p );
return( 0 );
/* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result
* plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the
* subtraction is performed through side channels. */
/* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that
* A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */
memcpy( A->p, d, n * ciL );
/* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks,
* do the calculation without using conditional tests. */
/* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */
d[n] += 1;
d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, N->p );
/* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n
* so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is.
* If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n
* so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction
* which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d.
* This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */
mpi_safe_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] );
}
/*
* Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N
*
* See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters.
*/
static int mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T )
static void mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T )
{
mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1;
mbedtls_mpi U;
......@@ -1969,7 +2031,7 @@ static int mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
U.n = U.s = (int) z;
U.p = &z;
return( mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ) );
mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T );
}
/*
......@@ -2055,13 +2117,13 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
else
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[1], A ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T );
/*
* X = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &RR ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T );
if( wsize > 1 )
{
......@@ -2074,7 +2136,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[j], &W[1] ) );
for( i = 0; i < wsize - 1; i++ )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T );
/*
* W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1]
......@@ -2084,7 +2146,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[i], N->n + 1 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[i], &W[i - 1] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T );
}
}
......@@ -2121,7 +2183,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
/*
* out of window, square X
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T );
continue;
}
......@@ -2139,12 +2201,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
* X = X^wsize R^-1 mod N
*/
for( i = 0; i < wsize; i++ )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T );
/*
* X = X * W[wbits] R^-1 mod N
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, &W[wbits], N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montmul( X, &W[wbits], N, mm, &T );
state--;
nbits = 0;
......@@ -2157,18 +2219,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
*/
for( i = 0; i < nbits; i++ )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T );
wbits <<= 1;
if( ( wbits & ( one << wsize ) ) != 0 )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T );
}
/*
* X = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ) );
mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T );
if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 )
{
......
......@@ -131,6 +131,20 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#else
#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid."
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
!defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
#define inline __inline
......@@ -144,6 +158,233 @@
static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count;
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
/*
* Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for
* side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was
* that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but
* unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with
* no opportunity for the user to do anything about it.
*
* The obvious strategies for addressing that include:
* - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments;
* - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules.
*
* Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is
* have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar.
*
* The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with
* HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
/* DRBG context type */
typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context;
/* DRBG context init */
static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( ctx );
}
/* DRBG context free */
static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( ctx );
}
/* DRBG function */
static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) );
}
/* DRBG context seeding */
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
int ret;
unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
/* The list starts with strong hashes */
const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len );
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
return( ret );
}
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
/* DRBG context type */
typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context;
/* DRBG context init */
static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctx );
}
/* DRBG context free */
static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctx );
}
/* DRBG function */
static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) );
}
/*
* Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does,
* we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy
* function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string.
* (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are
* concatenated before being used to update the secret state.)
*/
static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len)
{
(void) ctx;
memset( out, 0, len );
return( 0 );
}
/* DRBG context seeding */
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
int ret;
unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL,
secret_bytes, secret_len );
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
return( ret );
}
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
/* This will be used in the self-test function */
#define ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF
/*
* We need to expand secret data (the scalar) into a longer stream of bytes.
*
* We'll use the One-Step KDF from NIST SP 800-56C, with option 1 (H is a hash
* function) and empty FixedInfo. (Though we'll make it fit the DRBG API for
* convenience, this is not a full-fledged DRBG, but we don't need one here.)
*
* We need a basic hash abstraction layer to use whatever SHA-2 is available.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha512_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 );
#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 512 / 8 )
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha256_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 );
#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 256 / 8 )
#endif /* SHA512/SHA256 abstraction */
/*
* State consists of a 32-bit counter plus the secret value.
*
* We stored them concatenated in a single buffer as that's what will get
* passed to the hash function.
*/
typedef struct {
size_t total_len;
uint8_t buf[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
} ecp_drbg_context;
static void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) );
}
static void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) );
}
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
ctx->total_len = 4 + secret_len;
memset( ctx->buf, 0, 4);
return( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, ctx->buf + 4, secret_len ) );
}
static int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
ecp_drbg_context *ctx = p_rng;
int ret;
size_t len_done = 0;
uint8_t tmp[HASH_BLOCK_BYTES];
while( len_done < output_len )
{
uint8_t use_len;
/* This function is only called for coordinate randomisation, which
* happens only twice in a scalar multiplication. Each time needs a
* random value in the range [2, p-1], and gets it by drawing len(p)
* bytes from this function, and retrying up to 10 times if unlucky.
*
* So for the largest curve, each scalar multiplication draws at most
* 20 * 66 bytes. The minimum block size is 32 (SHA-256), so with
* rounding that means a most 20 * 3 blocks.
*
* Since we don't need to draw more that 255 blocks, don't bother
* with carry propagation and just return an error instead. We can
* change that it we even need to draw more blinding values.
*/
ctx->buf[3] += 1;
if( ctx->buf[3] == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
ret = HASH_FUNC( ctx->buf, ctx->total_len, tmp );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( output_len - len_done > HASH_BLOCK_BYTES )
use_len = HASH_BLOCK_BYTES;
else
use_len = output_len - len_done;
memcpy( output + len_done, tmp, use_len );
len_done += use_len;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
return( 0 );
}
#else /* DRBG/SHA modules */
#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid."
#endif /* DRBG/SHA modules */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row.
......@@ -191,6 +432,10 @@ struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul
ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */
ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */
} state;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx;
unsigned char drbg_seeded;
#endif
};
/*
......@@ -203,6 +448,10 @@ static void ecp_restart_rsm_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx )
ctx->T = NULL;
ctx->T_size = 0;
ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
ecp_drbg_init( &ctx->drbg_ctx );
ctx->drbg_seeded = 0;
#endif
}
/*
......@@ -224,6 +473,10 @@ static void ecp_restart_rsm_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx )
mbedtls_free( ctx->T );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
ecp_drbg_free( &ctx->drbg_ctx );
#endif
ecp_restart_rsm_init( ctx );
}
......@@ -1493,7 +1746,10 @@ static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *p
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) );
if( count++ > 10 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 );
......@@ -1843,7 +2099,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R
i = d;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, T_size, x[i] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != 0 )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
......@@ -1964,6 +2222,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_final_norm;
final_norm:
MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV );
#endif
/*
* Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
......@@ -1976,10 +2235,11 @@ final_norm:
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.